Multiple Google ChromeOS Vulnerabilities
May 9, 2025Native Module-Based Malware Strikes Windows IIS Web Servers – Active IOCs
May 9, 2025Multiple Google ChromeOS Vulnerabilities
May 9, 2025Native Module-Based Malware Strikes Windows IIS Web Servers – Active IOCs
May 9, 2025Severity
High
Analysis Summary
Windows Remote Management (WinRM), Microsoft’s implementation of the WS-Management protocol, is a widely used tool for remote administration, enabling the execution of PowerShell commands, configuration management, and system monitoring. It listens by default on ports 5985 (HTTP) and 5986 (HTTPS) and allows authenticated users to establish remote sessions across an Active Directory (AD) environment. While intended for legitimate administrative tasks, WinRM’s deep integration with PowerShell and wide adoption make it an attractive tool for threat actors seeking stealthy lateral movement and privilege escalation within networks.
The typical WinRM-based attack chain begins with initial access, commonly obtained through phishing, credential dumping, or brute-force attacks. With access to a compromised endpoint, attackers proceed with reconnaissance using WinRM-enabled PowerShell commands such as Invoke-Command or Enter-PSSession to identify other accessible systems. Upon identifying targets, attackers authenticate using harvested credentials and spawn PowerShell sessions via wsmprovhost.exe, a legitimate Windows process. This approach allows malicious activity to blend in with regular administrative operations, minimizing suspicion.
Payload deployment is a critical phase in the attack chain, often executed through obfuscated PowerShell “cradles” that fetch and run additional malware directly in memory. These payloads bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI), disable event logging, and are deployed using techniques like reflective .NET module loaders.
In this method, a benign-looking PowerShell script is used to load and execute a .NET assembly, masking malicious code execution under legitimate administrative behavior. These tactics minimize forensic evidence and enable attackers to implant malware like “Specter” while maintaining a low detection footprint.
Due to its reliance on native Windows functionalities and encrypted channels, detecting WinRM-based lateral movement is challenging. However, defenders can take proactive steps by monitoring for unusual behaviors such as unexpected wsmprovhost.exe instances, atypical remote PowerShell usage, and suspicious authentication attempts from non-privileged accounts. Additionally, restricting WinRM access, enforcing strong password policies, and deploying behavior-based detection tools can help identify and block lateral movement before attackers reach critical assets such as domain controllers.
Impact
- Sensitive Credential Theft
- Privilege Escalation
- Gain Access
- Security Bypass
Remediation
- Limit WinRM usage to only trusted hosts and administrative users.
- Use Windows Firewall or Group Policy to block ports 5985 and 5986 where not required.
- Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access.
- Regularly rotate and audit administrative credentials.
- Monitor for and remediate exposed or reused passwords.
- Enable PowerShell transcription and module logging.
- Monitor for unusual wsmprovhost.exe activity.
- Correlate PowerShell remoting sessions with authentication logs for anomaly detection.
- Use EDR solutions that can detect in-memory execution and obfuscated PowerShell scripts.
- Alert on reflective .NET module loading and AMSI bypass techniques.
- Apply network segmentation to isolate critical assets.
- Enforce least privilege access using role-based access control (RBAC).
- Disable unnecessary administrative shares and remote services.
- Constrain PowerShell with Device Guard or application control policies.
- Block PowerShell v2 and enforce Constrained Language Mode where possible.
- Regularly audit PowerShell scripts for unauthorized or suspicious modifications.