

Critical File Inclusion Flaw Found in WordPress Plugin, Exposing Sites to Attack
April 11, 2025
Multiple SAP Products Vulnerabilities
April 11, 2025
Critical File Inclusion Flaw Found in WordPress Plugin, Exposing Sites to Attack
April 11, 2025
Multiple SAP Products Vulnerabilities
April 11, 2025Severity
High
Analysis Summary
Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered a deceptive campaign leveraging newly registered domains to distribute the Android malware SpyNote (also known as SpyMax). These malicious domains imitate official Google Play Store pages for popular apps like Chrome, tricking users into installing infected APKs. Notably, the attackers have used both English and Chinese-language content, with Chinese-language comments embedded in both the website and malware code, strongly suggesting a Chinese-speaking threat actor.
According to the Researcher, SpyNote, known for abusing Android’s accessibility services, allows attackers to steal data such as contacts, SMS messages, location, and files. It can also remotely control infected devices, activating cameras and microphones or executing arbitrary commands.
The delivery mechanism relies on clone websites with carousels of fake images. Clicking these images downloads a malicious APK, which installs a secondary APK via Android’s DialogInterface.OnClickListener. Once installed, SpyNote aggressively requests permissions, granting it deep control over the device. This malware has been seen in prior campaigns, including one in May 2024 that impersonated the antivirus software Avast. SpyNote has also been linked to known state-sponsored groups like OilAlpha and is believed to share similarities with the Gigabud malware, suggesting a common origin—possibly the Chinese-speaking threat group GoldFactory.

This campaign is part of a broader mobile threat landscape, with over 4 million mobile-focused social engineering attacks recorded in 2024 alone. According to Lookout, iOS users were targeted twice as often as Android users for the first time in 2024, though Android still suffers from more sophisticated malware. The advisory also brings attention to other Android threats like BadBazaar and MOONSHINE, which are used in state-level espionage. These malware families mimic messaging or religious apps to spread spyware capable of collecting sensitive data. Their targets include NGOs, journalists, and communities like the Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Taiwanese.
BadBazaar has ties to the Chinese APT group APT15 (aka Flea, Nylon Typhoon, Royal APT) and has been active since at least 2018. Meanwhile, MOONSHINE has been used by the Earth Minotaur in surveillance campaigns against ethnic minorities. Both malware families can exfiltrate photos, messages, and locations to attacker-controlled infrastructure. Specifically, MOONSHINE uses a SCOTCH ADMIN panel for device monitoring, with 635 compromised devices logged as of January 2024. The geopolitical implications of such operations were underscored by the arrest of Dilshat Reshit in Sweden, a Uyghur activist suspected of spying on the diaspora—showing how mobile malware campaigns tie directly into global surveillance and repression strategies.
Impact
- Sensitive Data Theft
- Unauthorized Access
Indicators of Compromise
Domain Name
- pknby.top
- jygst.top
- dacmj.top
- sakiw.top
- fdtya.top
- hgcks.top
- kyudfsaugsda.top
IP
- 156.244.19.63
MD5
0061e9b2ce995fdc2c004e9089c78ef8
e1cada347451376ee3e9a2c1744406c3
c9cdf3b21835998d485846f23785f37f
fa7b1b56ab9b592fa965921ce229a6b1
SHA-256
d36ef38009dab4be287978190f824245d40bd2b6b6b101ba5fe37bff80662cf6
f42daefe546b9079bab9fac2f17311e96eb3f0d2ca3af01867311efac2b8e757
19cebeebdbd950ea24e4d3a52bfde6e570a9ac29d31e97cb8c01894c4fa9014b
482eb4aa6dc6f873063b7b6b5378bd052298cc6f8e60b6a5ddc9beba56d0b05f
SHA1
88b15d7bfa5293697d8dea9ada079056877f9d81
3602a70747d10210eb6139cf580f587f24fdc77f
666de216ef147f1a327a27ebabb3c9c14ddb4d7f
ca3dcc518fc63892931845d67c2adb93e0d496ef
Remediation
- Block all threat indicators at your respective controls.
- Search for indicators of compromise (IOCs) in your environment utilizing your respective security controls.
- Only install apps from official app stores like Google Play or Apple’s App Store.
- Do not download APK files from unknown websites or links, even if they resemble legitimate sources.
- Check app reviews, developer details, and download counts.
- Be cautious of apps requesting excessive permissions that are not relevant to their functionality.
- Deploy reputable mobile security software capable of detecting trojans like SpyNote, BadBazaar, and MOONSHINE.
- Regularly update security apps to ensure the latest threat definitions are active.
- Train users to recognize phishing and fake app install pages.
- Encourage users to verify URLs before clicking on download buttons or granting permissions.
- Use Mobile Device Management (MDM) solutions to restrict installations from unknown sources.
- Enforce app whitelisting and monitor for suspicious activity on enterprise devices.
- Keep Android and iOS operating systems up to date with the latest security patches.
- Enable automatic updates where possible.
- Detect and respond to signs of data exfiltration or unusual access patterns.
- Use threat intelligence feeds to stay informed about newly registered domains used for malware delivery.
- Report any fake apps or phishing pages to Google, Apple, or relevant authorities.
- Share indicators of compromise (IOCs) with industry partners and security communities.