They also have a history of asking for company-issued laptops to have their delivery addresses changed, frequently sending them to middlemen at laptop farms. These middlemen get paid by foreign facilitators for their work, and they are in charge of setting up remote desktop software, which enables the North Korean actors to access the computers.

Furthermore, it's possible for the same business to hire several contractors, or for one person to take on multiple identities. In other instances, according to researchers, the fictitious contractors asked for authorization to use their computers and even forced companies to completely cancel laptop shipments because they altered the delivery address while the laptop was en route.

This conduct is consistent with the tradecraft of Nickel Tapestry, which aims to steer clear of corporate laptops to reduce access to forensic evidence and maybe do away with the requirement for an in-country facilitator. With this strategy, the contractors can remotely access the company network using their computers. The revelation of evidence indicating that a contractor whose job was terminated by an unidentified company due to subpar performance resorted to sending extortion emails with ZIP attachments containing evidence of stolen data is a sign that threat actors are evolving and amplifying their activities.

This adjustment modifies the risk profile of recruiting North Korean IT staff by mistake considerably. They are now searching for larger amounts of money faster through data theft and extortion from inside the company's defenses rather than just a consistent paycheck. While extortion scenarios only seem to arise in a small fraction of events, the total North Korean IT worker operation affects hundreds, if not thousands of roles worldwide. These initiatives have mostly targeted businesses that employ remote workers to produce software.

Organizations have been advised to be alert during the hiring process to combat the threat. This includes carrying out comprehensive identity checks, holding in-person or video interviews, and keeping an eye out for attempts to reroute corporate IT equipment sent to the contractor's declared home address, route paychecks to money transfer services, and gain unauthorized remote access to the corporate network. Different from previous Nickel Tapestry frauds, ransom requests have surfaced. Still, the behavior seen before the blackmail fits with other schemes employing North Korean laborers.

Impact

• Sensitive Data Theft
• Financial Loss
• Unauthorized Access
• Data Exfiltration
• Identity Theft

Remediation

• Never trust or open links and attachments received from unknown sources/senders.
• Implement multi-factor authentication to add an extra layer of security to login processes.
• Regularly monitor network activity for any unusual behavior, as this may indicate that a cyberattack is underway.
• Organizations need to stay vigilant and follow best practices for cybersecurity to protect their systems and data from potential threats. This includes regularly updating software and implementing strong access controls and monitoring tools.
• Develop a comprehensive incident response plan to respond effectively in case of a security breach or data leakage.
• Maintain regular backups of critical data and systems to ensure data recovery in case of a security incident.
• Adhere to security best practices, including the principle of least privilege, and ensure that users and applications have only the necessary permissions.
• Establish a robust patch management process to ensure that security patches are evaluated, tested, and applied promptly.
• Conduct security audits and assessments to evaluate the overall security posture of your systems and networks.
• Implement network segmentation to contain and isolate potential threats to limit their impact on critical systems.