macOS has long been known for its layered security protections, but recent attacks demonstrate that adversaries are increasingly turning these very defenses into weapons. Rather than relying on traditional exploits, threat actors now abuse legitimate features like Keychain, System Integrity Protection (SIP), Transparency Consent and Control (TCC), Gatekeeper, File Quarantine, and XProtect to steal credentials, bypass protections, and evade detection. This represents a shift from blunt-force malware delivery to stealthy, built-in abuse of trusted system components.

Keychain is a primary target, with attackers using native commands such as security list-keychains and security dump-keychain to harvest stored credentials. Detection requires process-creation monitoring via Apple’s Endpoint Security Framework (ESF), coupled with Sigma rules that flag suspicious security command executions. SIP is also abused, with attackers checking its status using csrutil status or booting into Recovery Mode to tamper with protections. Since these actions may evade standard logging, defenders must implement continuous SIP status monitoring and alerts, aligning with MITRE ATT&CK discovery techniques.

Other system safeguards like File Quarantine, Gatekeeper, and TCC are also being weaponized. Attackers bypass File Quarantine using tools like curl or wget, or by stripping the com.apple.quarantine attribute via xattr. Gatekeeper, which enforces code-signing, is disabled or tricked through commands such as spctl --master-disable, exposing users to unsigned apps. TCC, which regulates access to sensitive resources, is manipulated via clickjacking overlays or database tampering, often requiring SIP bypass. Effective defenses include monitoring xattr executions, alerting on spctl misuse, and auditing TCC.db modifications for unusual activity.

Finally, attackers also target Apple’s malware defenses XProtect and XProtect Remediator by unloading their daemons through launchctl or injecting unsigned kernel extensions (kexts). These attempts undermine the core malware protection built into macOS. To counter this, defenders must track suspicious launchctl unload executions and unsigned kext load attempts. Ultimately, while macOS offers a strong integrated security stack, adversaries are evolving to exploit it. Organizations must adopt detailed ESF-based logging, apply Sigma detection rules for critical commands, and reinforce protections with third-party EDR solutions to close visibility gaps and stay ahead of sophisticated threats.