Severity
High
Analysis Summary
Researchers have identified recent Mustang Panda activity that involves the use of DLL side-loading to deliver PlugX. The initial infection vector is an executable downloaded from a remote URL. The executable is responsible for installing the malware by dropping the required files (a DLL loader, a legitimate binary, and the PlugX payload) onto the system. The legitimate binary is the Adobe CEF Helper and is vulnerable to DLL side-loading. When the installer runs the legitimate binary, the dropped DLL is loaded. This DLL is the loader for the final payload. First, it reads a hardcoded .dat file that contains the XOR key for decrypting the final payload, then it performs the decryption and loads the malware into memory. Once running in memory, the PlugX payload is able to decrypt its configuration data, which includes its installation location, the XOR key for C2 communication, and any C2 addresses and ports
Impact
- Information Theft
- Exposure of Sensitive Data
Indicators of Compromise
Domain Name
- fuckeryoumm[.]nmb[.]bet
IP
- 18[.]138[.]107[.]235
MD5
- 8a485194a956512174401cdb8df7eaa7
SHA-256
- 28d2fef9323884cc81b1a39f3c17734606a79e79786496c5a556e25e00bdf10a
SHA-1
- 71e85c44b1a9eb28929783c75b3cd81135bd9a2c
Remediation
- Block all threat indicators at your respective controls.
- Search for IOCs in your environment.
- Always be suspicious about emails sent by unknown senders.
- Never click on the links/attachments sent by unknown senders