Severity
High
Analysis Summary
Researchers have identified recent Mustang Panda activity that involves the use of DLL side-loading to deliver PlugX. The initial infection vector is an executable downloaded from a remote URL. The executable is responsible for installing the malware by dropping the required files (a DLL loader, a legitimate binary, and the PlugX payload) onto the system. The legitimate binary is the Adobe CEF Helper and is vulnerable to DLL side-loading. When the installer runs the legitimate binary, the dropped DLL is loaded. This DLL is the loader for the final payload. First, it reads a hardcoded .dat file that contains the XOR key for decrypting the final payload, then it performs the decryption and loads the malware into memory. Once running in memory, the PlugX payload is able to decrypt its configuration data, which includes its installation location, the XOR key for C2 communication, and any C2 addresses and ports
Impact
- Information Theft
- Exposure of Sensitive Data
Indicators of Compromise
MD5
- 8d7a9fbff4c7024d21fa0550042592c8
- 5959d00e2d7b57e1e5885750c0900946
- f826e9e84b5690725b5f5a0cd12ed125
SHA-256
- 8e1885e512729d35a143b5ba5b3733159891b77bc3e8fd4566844060b0626324
- ce59d8cf4b6eca3420438e05b059d6f61cc484e6fb00b1b2a7033bf36446e683
- 12ec4b64471b01b4fd63b4b3294ce93e1a0a1061eddb57181fca22e2a35d16f5
SHA-1
- 8b9662a37595588c096e642a35818a553af328bd
- 3f69df382de737a7dee988f98ea35d0b44dc48eb
- c891c990b65aad9f56a1bee4cf8f272b364b852b
Remediation
- Block all threat indicators at your respective controls.
- Search for IOCs in your environment.
- Always be suspicious about emails sent by unknown senders.
- Never click on the links/attachments sent by unknown senders