Severity
High
Analysis Summary
Researchers have identified recent Mustang Panda activity that involves the use of DLL side-loading to deliver PlugX. The initial infection vector is an executable downloaded from a remote URL. The executable is responsible for installing the malware by dropping the required files (a DLL loader, a legitimate binary, and the PlugX payload) onto the system. The legitimate binary is the Adobe CEF Helper and is vulnerable to DLL side-loading. When the installer runs the legitimate binary, the dropped DLL is loaded. This DLL is the loader for the final payload. First, it reads a hardcoded .dat file that contains the XOR key for decrypting the final payload, then it performs the decryption and loads the malware into memory. Once running in memory, the PlugX payload is able to decrypt its configuration data, which includes its installation location, the XOR key for C2 communication, and any C2 addresses and ports
Impact
- Information Theft
- Exposure of Sensitive Data
Indicators of Compromise
Filename
- Action Plan 2022[.]zip
- goopdate[.]dllx
MD5
- fcd6691fc59610a50740a170a8a5a76f
- e7d91f187ff9037d52458e2085929409
SHA-256
- ef3966d15af3665ee5126df394cefdf6f78fce77db7a70d5f35c19c234715035
- ef54e266f8fc9eb97d71c76f2a53b65bef83fe5fc270fbfe83463f83678ff44c
SHA-1
- 396c9bf470fed61ed771561346b60678a6958fce
- 6020bde7924e6e7933b2b4fc573e6e8f529ebc55
Remediation
- Always be suspicious about emails sent by unknown senders.
- Never click on links/attachments sent by unknown senders.
- Block all threat indicators at your respective controls.
- Search for IOCs in your environment.